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There currently are nearly thirteen hundred persons in Ameri-
can prisons under sentence of death. For the vast majority of them,
the elaborate state and federal appeals process can and will delay
execution months, years, perhaps indefinitely. They wish to live,
and their lawyers will explore every legal avenue in order to keep
their clients alive. For some on death row, however, the darkest fear
is not execution, but the prospect of living out their natural years
incarcerated in a six-by-nine cell, under constant surveillance, with
little or no hope of ever regaining their freedom. For these men
and women, termination of their appeals and execution of sentence
may well appear as a preferable option to an inexorable mental and
physical deterioration. They want to hear the executioner's song.
Of those executions carried out in the United States since the
Supreme Court ruled that capital punishment does not violate the
eighth amendment,' several have been termed voluntary, in that the
condemned prisoners cut off their appeals in order to hasten their
punishment. 2 So long as the current system continues, with its op-
portunities for numerous appeals and delays but with the death sen-
tence an ever more frequently imposed penalty, we may expect
some of the present and future occupants of death row to terminate
their appeals. Such a decision raises not only legal but moral ques-
tions as well; indeed, some opponents of capital punishment argue
that there is no right to terminate appeals because this leads to
* The author wishes to thank Professor Richard Bonnie of the University of Virginia
Law School for his advice in the preparation of this Article.
** Professor of History, Virginia Commonwealth University. J.D., University of Vir-
ginia, 1983; Ph.D., Columbia University, 1968; A.B., Columbia University, 1961. Co-
editor of Lm-rERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS. (M. Urofsky & D. Levy eds., 5 vols., 1971-78).
1 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
2 The four voluntary executions were of Gary Gilmore (Utah, Jan. 17, 1977), Jesse
Bishop (Nevada, Oct. 22, 1979), Steven Judy (Indiana, Mar. 9, 1981), and Frank Cop-
pola (Virginia, Aug. 10, 1982). Their cases are discussed below. See infta notes 6-59 and
accompanying text (Part I).
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state-abetted suicide.3 Surprisingly little has been written on the
subject,4 perhaps because advocates of the death penalty do not
consider it an issue, while abolitionists find it an embarassing di-
lemma.5 This Article will argue that so long as capital punishment is
maintained, there are legal and moral justifications for permitting
presently competent prisoners to knowingly elect termination of the
appeals process and thus bring on execution of sentence.
I. CURRENT CASE LAW
Case law on this subject is sparse, but in general upholds the
right of a prisoner to terminate his or her appeal if the person is
presently competent, and knowingly and voluntarily undertakes that
course of action.
The leading case is that of Gary Mark Gilmore, the first person
executed after the Gregg decision. As Chief Justice Burger noted:
This case may be unique in the annals of the Court. Not only does
Gary Mark Gilmore request no relief himself, but on the contrary, he
has expressly and repeatedly stated since his conviction in the Utah
courts that he had received a fair trial and had been well treated by the
Utah authorities. Nor does he claim to be innocent of the crime for
which he was convicted. Indeed, his only complaint against Utah or its
judicial process. . . has been with respect to the delay on the part of
the State in carrying out the sentence.
6
Gilmore's case was certainly unique, in that he sought not only
death, but carried on his campaign with the help of a literary agent
and media eager to exploit this unusual story.7 "Don't the people of
Utah have the courage of their convictions?" he asked. "You sen-
tence a man to die-me-and when I accept this most extreme pun-
ishment with grace and dignity, you, the people of Utah want to
back down and argue with me about it. You're silly."
'8
Gilmore's problem was not with the state, which wanted to
carry out the sentence, but with opponents of capital punishment
3 See Lenhard ex rel. Bishop v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 812 (1979) (stay of execution
denied) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4 See Strafer, Volunteeringfor Execution: Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third
Party Intervention, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860 (1983); Note, The Death Row Right to
Die: Suicide or Intimate Decision?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 575 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Death Row Right to Die]; Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently Incompe-
tent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Execution of the Presently
Incompetent].
5 See, e.g., H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
121-25 (1977).
6 Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 n.1 (1976) (mem.) (temporary stay of execu-
tion vacated) (Burger, C.J., concurring in vacating of stay).
7 See N. MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG (1979).
8 Id. at 521.
[Vol. 75
TERMINATION OF APPEAL
who, after Gilmore rebuffed their efforts, persuaded his mother,
Bessie Gilmore, to file a next friend petition seeking review of the
case. The Supreme Court granted a stay of execution on December
3, 1976, and after receiving responses from Utah and from Gil-
more's attorneys, vacated the stay ten days later. In its brief order,
the Court noted that it was convinced that Gilmore "made a know-
ing and intelligent waiver of any and all federal rights he might have
asserted," and the execution could go forward. 9 In a concurring
opinion, Chief Justice Burger would have denied Bessie Gilmore
any standing to file a next friend petition so long as Gilmore himself
was competent and able to assert or waive his own rights.' 0
Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented,
with Justice White arguing that "the consent of a convicted defend-
ant in a criminal case does not privilege a State to impose a punish-
ment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth Amendment."" Moreover,
Justice White doubted that Gilmore could waive his rights in state
court until the whole issue of the constitutionality of capital punish-
ment had been resolved. 12 Justice Marshall, in a separate dissent,
questioned Gilmore's competence in light of a suicide attempt as
well as the reliability of the state's psychiatric examination, which he
considered inadequate.' 3 Justice Blackmun, in a single paragraph,
noted that he believed the constitutional issues involved were im-
portant enough to warrant a full hearing by the Court.14 With the
Justices thus split five to four, Gilmore and Utah got their wish, and
in the early morning of January 17, 1977, a firing squad executed
Gilmore.
The next case dealing with this issue did not come before the
Court until the fall of 1979.'5 Jesse Walter Bishop had, from the
time he was arrested for a murder committed in the course of a rob-
bery, attempted to waive one right after another. He told the Ne-
vada trial court that he wished to represent himself, and after three
psychiatrists concluded he was competent, entered a plea of guilty.
At the sentencing stage of the trial, Bishop refused to allow the
court-appointed "standby counsel" to introduce mitigating evi-
9 Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976) (mem.).
10 Id. at 1014 (Burger, CJ., concurring in vacating of temporary stay of execution).
11 Id. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting from vacating of temporary stay of execution).
12 Id. (White, J., dissenting from vacating of temporary stay of execution).
13 Id. at 1019-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting from vacating of temporary stay of exe-
cution).
14 Id. at 1020 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from vacating of temporary stay of exe-
cution).




dence. The three-judge panel that heard the case did take notice of
Bishop's previous felony convictions, as well as the aggravating cir-
cumstances in the case, and sentenced him to death.
Bishop then allowed the Clark County Public Defenders office,
his "standby counsel," to take an appeal to the Nevada Supreme
Court. But after the papers had been filed and before argument,
Bishop sought to dismiss the appeal of his conviction, and asked
review only of the sentencing phase. The court ignored his request
and reviewed the entire case, finding no reversible error.' 6 Under
Faretta v. California,17 Bishop had the right to represent himself, and
throughout the trial he had the assistance of standby counsel if he
wished to use them. "When a defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waives his right to counsel, as here, his refusal to present a defense
does not negate his pro per election."' 8
Following the decision of the Nevada Supreme Court, the trial
court relieved the public defenders of any further responsibility for
Bishop. But, as Justice Marshall put it, "referring to their moral and
ethical obligations, they filed [a] federal habeas corpus petition
against Bishop's wishes."' 19 In the district court, Bishop appeared in
person and stated that he did not wish to pursue further litigation.
When that court denied the writ, holding that Bishop had made a
valid waiver,20 his former counsel nonetheless appealed to the Ninth
Circuit, which affirmed. 2 1 In a concurring opinion, Judge Joseph T.
Sneed, although applauding the efforts of the public defenders "to
avoid what they perceive to be a miscarriage of justice," denied
them standing to carry an appeal.22 He concluded:
I am convinced that Bishop is sane and that he has made a knowing
and intelligent choice to forego his federal remedies. It is difficult for
me to imagine that I would make a similar choice were I in his posi-
tion. What I might do, however, is not the test. Bishop is an individ-
ual who, for reasons I can fathom only slightly, has chosen to forego
his federal remedies. Assuming his competence, which on this record I
must, he should be free to so choose. To deny him that would be to
incarcerate the spirit-the one thing that remains free and which the
16 Bishop v. State, 95 Nev. 511, 518, 597 P.2d 273, 277 (1979).
17 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant in state criminal trial has constitutional right to
self-representation if he so desires).
18 Bishop v. State, 95 Nev. at 517, 597 P.2d at 276.
19 Lenhard ex rel. Bishop v. Wolff, 444 U.S. at 810 (Marshall, J., dissenting from de-
nial of stay of execution).
20 Lenhard ex rel. Bishop v. Wolff, 603 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1979), stay of execution denied,
444 U.S. 807 (1979) (mem.).
21 Id. at 93.
22 Id. at 94 (Sneed, J., concurring).
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state need not and should not imprison.25
This time, the Supreme Court denied the public defenders' pe-
tition for a stay of execution without comment,24 which in turn elic-
ited a protest from Justice Marshall. Bishop, according to Justice
Marshall, had no right to waive a challenge to his execution. "Soci-
ety's independent stake in enforcement of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment cannot be over-
ridden by a defendant's purported waiver. By refusing to pursue his
Eighth Amendment claim, Bishop has, in effect, sought the State's
assistance in committing suicide."
25
A year and a half passed between Bishop's execution on Octo-
ber 22, 1979, and the next execution in this country, that of Steven
T. Judy, who also successfully waived his appeal. Judy had been
convicted in February 1980 for the murder of a woman and her
three children. At the sentencing phase of the bifurcated proceed-
ings, Judy ordered his court-appointed attorneys not to present any
evidence of mitigating circumstances to the jury. In fact, Judy told
the jury that he would advise them to give him the death sentence,
"because he had no doubt that he would kill again if he had an op-
portunity, and some of the people he might kill in the future might
be members of the jury."
26
Following the imposition of the death penalty, Judy's lawyers
filed an appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, but he then in-
structed them to drop the appeal because he wished to waive his
rights and terminate the proceedings. Indiana, however, required
an automatic review of all capital sentences, and the lawyers peti-
tioned the court to resolve the conflict between their client's wishes
and the dictates of the state's penal code, a conflict they termed an
"insoluble professional and ethical problem."
27
Judy personally appeared before the court, and "very freely and
openly discussed his situation with the members of this Court. It
was obvious. . . that Judy well understood his situation and the re-
sults that could be expected from our acceptance of his waiver.
'"28
He also freely admitted his guilt, and went on: "I thought I was
treated fair, more than fair. I was provided with good counsel and I
23 Id. (Sneed, J., concurring).
24 Lenhard ex rel. Bishop v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 807 (1979) (mem.) (stay of execu-
tion denied).
25 Id. at 811-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26 Judy v. State, 275 Ind. 145, 155, 416 N.E.2d 95, 100 (1981).
27 Id. at 149, 416 N.E.2d at 97.
28 Id. at 155, 416 N.E.2d at 100.
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lost. There's no sense going on with this." 29 Relying upon psychi-
atric reports as well as their personal observation of Judy at the
hearing, the judges found him competent to waive his rights of
appeal.3
0
The court also found, however, that Judy did not have an un-
limited right to waiver, in that state law mandated a review of all
cases in which the death penalty had been imposed.31 This initial
review for error served not only the interests of the defendant, but
of society as well, to make sure justice had been done. The court
examined the trial proceedings, and found no error. 32 Judy was
then free to terminate the appeals process, which he did. No further
appeals were carried to either state or federal courts, and he was
executed on March 9, 1981.
The fourth voluntary execution came in Virginia a year later,
and led some abolitionists to charge that the United States Supreme
Court had acted with undue haste to kill a man. Frank J. Coppola
had been convicted of killing a woman during a robbery of her
home by beating her head against the floor in order to elicit infor-
mation about where money was hidden. A former policeman and
seminarian, Coppola insisted he was innocent, but after the state's
highest court found no error in his trial33 and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari, 34 he decided to drop his appeal. He was ready to
die, he said, "to preserve his dignity and spare his family further
agony." 3
5
Coppola fired his attorney, J. Gray Lawrence, Jr., but Lawrence
refused to accept the decision. He believed that Virginia's capital
punishment statute, which had never been tested in federal courts,
might be unconstitutional, and no one should be executed until its
validity had been confirmed. Other civil liberties lawyers contended
that Coppola's wish to be executed was irrational.36
Less than thirty-six hours before the scheduled execution, Law-
rence petitioned for a stay of execution in federal district court. At
the hearing before Judge D. Dortch Warriner, Coppola, his head
already shaved, declared: "I adamantly stand by my decision to seek
29 Id. at 157, 416 N.E.2d at 101.
30 Id. at 157, 416 N.E.2d at 101.
31 Id. at 157-58, 416 N.E.2d at 102.
32 Id. at 173, 416 N.E.2d at 111.
33 Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797 (1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1103 (1980).
34 Coppola v. Virginia, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980) (denial of certiorari).
35 San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 11, 1982.
36 Los Angeles Times, Aug. 11, 1982, p.4 .
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execution, and it is my sincere wish that it be carried out." T3 7 Judge
Warriner, rejecting the petition, compared the efforts to keep Cop-
pola alive to attempts to keep terminally ill patients from dying.
"We are performing the legal equivalent of inserting tubes. . . into
him so that we can satisfy the quite appropriate urge to save his life,
not so much for the good it does the client but for the good it does
US.'"38
One day later, however, Lawrence secured a stay of execution
from the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, with Judge John
D. Butzner noting possible questions about the constitutionality of
the state statute.3 9 Lawyers from the Virginia Attorney General's
office immediately flew to Washington to seek review by ChiefJus-
tice Burger, who had jurisdiction over the Fourth Circuit. They car-
ried with them a handwritten plea from Coppola asking that he be
allowed to die. ChiefJustice Burger then arranged a telephone con-
ference call with seven of his fellow Justices (Justice O'Connor was
out of the country). Only Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
objected to lifting the stay. ChiefJustice Burger reinstated the sen-
tence at 10:26 p.m. on August 10, 1982; one hour later, Coppola
was dead.
40
Eight months later, the State of Alabama executed John Louis
Evans III. Although he fought his sentence immediately prior to his
execution, his case originally reached the Supreme Court at a time
when he wanted to terminate his appeal. Evans had been convicted
of murder in the course of an armed robbery, an aggravating cir-
cumstance that led the jury to impose the death penalty. The con-
viction and sentence were reviewed and upheld by both the
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 4 1 and the Alabama Supreme
Court.42 After a petition for certiorari had been filed with the
United States Supreme Court, Evans instructed his counsel to drop




40 Mitchell v. Lawrence, 458 U.S. 1123 (1982) (stay of execution vacated). Jack
Greenberg, head of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and an opponent of capital punish-
ment, charged that "Burger acted egregiously because the entire thing deserved some
consideration. An ordinary small claims court case gets more careful consideration."
Defenders of the Court's action, however, noted that Coppola's sentence already had
been reviewed by state and federal courts eleven times. Los Angeles Daily Journal, Sept.
3, 1982.
41 Evans v. State, 361 So. 2d 654 (Ala. Crim. App.), af'd, 361 So. 2d 666 (Ala. 1977),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979).
42 361 So. 2d 666 (Ala. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979).
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drawal and the one for certiorari.43 Execution was then scheduled
for April 6, 1979.
Just four days before sentence was to be carried out, Evans'
mother filed a next friend petition for habeas corpus in federal dis-
trict court, claiming among other things that her son was incompe-
tent to pursue his own appeal. For evidence, she presented a sworn
affidavit of a psychiatrist who had neither personally interviewed nor
examined Evans, but who nonetheless concluded from conversa-
tions with other individuals that Evans was "not able to deal ration-
ally with his situation and . . . probably need[s] someone else to
make legal decisions affecting his life for him." 44 The reason the
psychiatrist had been unable to interview Evans was that Evans had
refused to be examined; he had admitted his guilt and chosen not to
pursue any further appeals. As District Judge Hand concluded:
The fact that Evans has elected not to pursue post-conviction remedies
that would serve to forestall the impending execution is not control-
ling, since it may well be, as the media has advertised, thatJohn Evans
has confronted his option of life imprisonment or death by execution
and has elected to place his bets on a new existence in some world
beyond this. The Court finds no evidence of irrationality in this; in-
deed, in view of the allegations ...[of] the death row conditions of
confinement case presently pending in this Court, it may well be that
John Evans has made the more rational choice.
45
The court went on to rule that Betty Evans had no standing absent
proof of incompetency of her son; in fact, Judge Hand noted acerbi-
cally that Evans' "biggest quarrel at this time seems to be with
those, such as the petitioner herein, who would interfere with his
ordered execution." 46 The writ of habeas corpus is not available for
" 'intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next
friends.' "47
Two days later, however, Betty Evans secured a temporary stay
of execution from Justice Rehnquist acting in chambers in the ab-
sence ofJustice Powell, who normally would have had jurisdiction.
48
Were he acting in full Court, Justice Rehnquist noted, he would vote
to deny the stay because the issues had been fully litigated below.
"There must come a time, even when so irreversible a penalty as
that of death has been imposed upon a particular defendant, when
the legal issues in the case have been sufficiently litigated and reliti-
43 Evans v. Alabama, 440 U.S. 930 (1979) (denial of certiorari).
44 Evans v. Bennett, 467 F. Supp. 1108, 1110 (S.D. Ala. 1979).
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1111.
47 Id. (quoting Wilson v. Dixon, 256 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1958)).
48 Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., as Circuit Justice).
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gated that the law must be allowed to run its course."'49 -He too
castigated the petitioner. "It is not Betty Evans, the applicant, who
has been sentenced to death, but her son, and the fact that her son
refuses to see a psychiatrist and has expressed a preference for elec-
trocution rather than serving the remainder of his life in a peniten-
tiary cannot confer standing upon her as 'next friend'. ..."50 But
because he was acting only as a surrogate for his brethren, and be-
cause of the "obviously irreversible nature of the death penalty,"
Justice Rehnquist granted a stay pending a full hearing by the Court
one week later.5'
In that one week, Betty Evans evidently convinced her son to
pick up his appeal, and on April 11, John Evans signed and verified
a petition for habeas. As a result, when the full Court met on April
13, it denied the previous petition because Alabama had not set a
new execution date, and the appeal, now properly filed, could be
evaluated by the lower courts.52 That process took four years, and
in the end, all of Evans' appeals failed. He was executed on April
22, 1983. 
3
The following year, the Court permitted William Jack Hammett,
convicted of murder in Texas, to withdraw his petition for certiorari,
noting in its per curiam opinion that this did not preclude him from
pursuing other avenues of collateral relief.54 Justice Marshall dis-
sented strongly because in his view, the Texas procedure of using
psychiatric examinations at the penalty stage to determine whether
the defendant would be dangerous in the future violated the fifth
amendment bar against self-incrimination. 55 Hammett, like other
inmates on death row in Texas, is still alive, as courts review broad
attacks on the state's capital punishment statute.
There are several cases in the lower courts dealing with the
right of condemned prisoners to terminate appeals, and in general,
that right has been upheld, although all of the defendants are still
awaiting execution. Appeals of other prisoners attacking various
provisions of capital punishment statutes effectively block nearly all
executions until the validity of the procedure is established. For the
most part, these cases hold that where automatic review is provided
for in the statute, the defendant does not have a right to waive that
49 Id. at 1303 (Rehnquist, J., as Circuit Justice).
50 Id. at 1305 (Rehnquist, J., as Circuit Justice).
51 Id. at 1306 (Rehnquist,J., as Circuit Justice).
52 Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 987 (1979) (mem.).
53 For details of the final review, see Death Penalty Update No. 94, Apr. 24, 1983, pp.
1-2.
54 Hammett v. Texas, 448 U.S. 725 (1980) (per curiam).
55 Id. at 732 (Marshall, J.,'dissenting).
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appeal because the interests of society require assurance that trial
and sentencing have been carried out justly.
5 6
As Justice Pomeroy of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court put it,
"an appellate court must consider the interests of society as a whole
in seeing to it that justice is done, regardless of what might other-
wise be the normal procedure. '57 Even when the prisoner "prefers
death to spending the remainder of his life in prison. . . the waiver
concept was never intended as a means of allowing a criminal de-
fendant to choose his own sentence. Especially is this so where, as
here, to do so would result in state aided suicide."58 But where the
mandated review has taken place and no reversible error has been
found, and where the prisoner was competent and knowingly chose
to waive his rights, he or she should be allowed to do so without
interference from third parties who lack standing.5 9
II. WAIVER OF APPEAL: LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
Although the death sentence is "qualitatively different from a
sentence of imprisonment,- 60 as the Supreme Court has recognized,
the doctrine of waiver in this area is derived substantially from gen-
eral rules of waiver in criminal cases. Under early common law doc-
trine, an accused could not waive any rights intended for his
protection. Later, he was allowed to waive those personal to him-
self, but not those in which the state maintained an interest.61 Cur-
rently, if there is no constitutional or statutory prohibition, or any
public policy involved, an accused may waive any privilege.62 The
ability to waive a particular right, however, does not give the de-
fendant a right to insist upon another procedure; for example,
waiver of a right to ajury trial does not imply a right to insist upon a
56 See, e.g., People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal. 2d 820, 457 P.2d 889, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49
(1969).
57 Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 439, 383 A.2d 174, 180 (1978).
58 Id. at 441, 383 A.2d at 181. See also Massie v. Sumner, 624 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1980)
(unable to waive automatic appeal to California Supreme Court of imposition of death
penalty), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1103 (1981).
59 See Potts v. Zant, 638 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1981); Rumbaugh v. Estelle, 558 F. Supp.
651 (N.D. Tex. 1983), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Rumbaugh v. McKaskle, 730 F.2d
291 (5th Cir. 1984); Clark v. Blackburn, 524 F. Supp. 1248 (M.D. La. 1981) (defendant's
mother not allowed to intervene because she did not prove son was mentally incompe-
tent); Goode v. State, 365 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). See
also 24A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1821 (1962).
60 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
61 See 21A AM. JUR. 2D, Criminal Law § 633 (1981).




A waiver of rights cannot be inferred from a defendant's si-
lence; in fact, every reasonable presumption will be made against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights by an accused.64 "The
determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the
right. . . must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, ex-
perience, and conduct of the accused."
65
If an accused insists upon waiving a right, the court must deter-
mine if he or she is competent, and if not, the court will refuse to
allow a petitioner to withdraw an appeal. The Supreme Court first
addressed this issue in 1966, when counsel for Melvin Rees, who
had been convicted of murder in Virginia, persuaded Rees to be ex-
amined by a psychiatrist, who concluded that Rees was mentally in-
competent. The Court unanimously held that filing the original
petition for certiorari properly brought the case before the Court,
and it refused Rees leave to withdraw the appeal.66 The Court re-
tained jurisdiction, but ordered the district court to conduct "suita-
ble hearings" on Rees' competency. 67 Despite strenuous efforts to
terminate his appeal, Harry Anderson, convicted of murder in Ken-
tucky, similarly was adjudged incompetent, and the case remanded
for further hearings. 68 In neither case did the Court issue more
than a brief per curiam order, and it failed to provide any guide-
lines, evidently relying on the lower courts to evaluate each case
individually. 6
9
Once competence is established, the waiver must be voluntary,
undertaken knowingly, and with an understanding of the likely con-
sequences. In a confession case, where the issue was whether the
accused had freely confessed to the crime, the Court explained:
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly estab-
lished test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test
of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free
and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to con-
fess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been over-
borne and his capacity for self-determination critically, impaired, the
63 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S.24 (1965). See also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368 (1979) (right to a public trial does not confer right to a private trial).
64 See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) (counsel cannot waive client's constitu-
tional right to plead not guilty without client's consent); Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.
506 (1962) (defendant can in some circumstances waive right to counsel by silence).
65 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
66 Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 313 (1966).
67 Id. at 314.
68 Anderson v. Kentucky, 376 U.S. 940, 940 (1964) (mein.).
69 See Note, Execution of the Presently Incompetent, supra note 4, at 772, 818.
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use of his confession offends due process. 70
Whether a waiver is voluntary is a "question of fact to be deter-
mined from the totality of all the circumstances. '7 1 Beyond that, it
is the responsibility of the court to determine if the defendant knows
what he is doing, what he is giving up, and what the consequences
may be. The mere failure to appeal cannot be taken as a knowing
waiver of rights, and therefore habeas relief always has remained
available. 72 Once the accused intelligently chooses to exercise a
waiver, he or she must bear the consequences. Thus, if a defendant
chooses not to utilize counsel but insists on self-representation,
there can be no appeal afterwards based on lack of counsel.
73
As noted above, the right to terminate appeals in death sen-
tence cases is partially circumscribed. The interests of the state in
ensuring that so severe a penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or un-
justly prevents waiver of any mandated automatic appeal. Beyond
that, should a condemned prisoner change his or her mind after ini-
tially waiving appeal, collateral attack remains open. "Conventional
notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is
at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged."
74
In all cases, whether one believes that the issue ultimately was
decided correctly by the courts or not, there is no doubt that judges
do pay close attention to the requirements of competency, voluntar-
iness, and knowledge of rights and consequences on the part of the
accused. In Rumbaugh v. Estelle,75 the district court included an ex-
amination of the following testimony by Charles Rumbaugh, who
was protesting efforts by his parents to pursue an appeal on his
behalf:
Q Is there anything that you would like to tell us. . . about the testi-
mony of the doctors relating specifically to the depression that they
believe you're experiencing now. [sic]
A. Well, I don't feel I'm depressed right now. I haven't been taking
any medication for approximately thirty days. I was taking medication,
an antipsychotic drug, and I haven't experienced any problems since I
70 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). Although enunciated in the
context of a confession case, the Culombe Court's language regarding voluntariness is
nevertheless useful in analyzing voluntariness in waiver situations.
71 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
72 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (writ of habeas corpus should be dis-
missed for failure to raise claim in state courts only when applicant deliberately bypassed
orderly procedure of state courts).
73 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
74 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963).
75 558 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Tex. 1983), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Rumbaugh v.
McKaskle, 730 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1984).
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quit taking it. And I think I understand my situation very well and I
believe my decision is a logical and rational one ....
Q. Are you anxious for some kind of a resolution of this case one way
or the other?
A. Yes. There has to be an end to it. You know, it's gone on and on
for eight years and that's long enough.
Q. And is it your desire at this time to waive your further appeals
available to you?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And are you fully aware that if you decline to pursue your appeal
and the Court finds that you are competent to do so, that you will be
executed by the State of Texas?
A. I'm aware of that.
Q. Is this a decision that you've come to over a lengthy period of
time?
A. Yes it is.7
6
The court concluded: "After considering all of the evidence the
Court finds that Charles Rumbaugh has a realistic understanding of
his present position and of the choices available to him, and that he
is mentally competent to make a rational choice with respect to con-
tinuing or abandoning further litigation."
7
In cases where competency was in doubt or the court did not
believe that the prisoner fully understood the consequences of
waiver, termination of appeal was denied. In People v. Stanworth,78
the California Supreme Court believed that the "defendant's refusal
to act to extricate himself from the threat of death must be deemed
equivalent of an inability to do so," and it refused to allow him to
discharge counsel in his effort to block further appeals. 79 In another
case arising in California, the failure of the state to hold hearings on
the defendant's competency led the federal appellate court to block
his efforts at waiver.80 For the most part, however, courts have not
taken a defendant's desire to terminate appeals as prima facie evi-
dence of either incompetency or lack of understanding.
8'
III. WAIVER OF APPEAL: THE ABOLITIONIST RESPONSE
If it is agreed that current law allows condemned prisoners to
terminate their appeals, it must nonetheless be noted that oppo-
nents of capital punishment believe that they should not be allowed
76 Id. at 653.
77 Id. at 654. Cf. Potts v. Zant, 638 F.2d 727, 732-33 (5th Cir. 1981) (examining
transcript of defendant's testimony).
78 71 Cal. 2d 820, 457 P.2d 889, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1969).
79 Id. at 835, 457 P.2d at 899, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 59 (emphasis in original).
80 Massie v. Sumner, 624 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1103 (1981).
81 Clark v. Blackburn, 524 F. Supp. 1248 (M.D. La. 1981).
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to do so. The most common argument is that acquiescence in the
sentence amounts to state-abetted suicide. In his dissent in Bishop,
Justice Marshall, who has consistently argued, albeit unsuccessfully
so far, that the death sentence is unconstitutional under the eighth
amendment, charged that "the Court has permitted the State's
mechanism of execution to be triggered by an entirely arbitrary fac-
tor: the defendant's decision to acquiesce in his own death. In my
view, the procedure the Court approves today amounts to nothing
less than state-administered suicide."8 2 For abolitionists, the death
penalty is "no less [barbarous] on those occasions when a murderer
welcomes his own legal execution"83 than when the prisoner invol-
untarily goes to death.
Hugo A. Bedau, one of the leading abolitionist spokesmen, has
set out four arguments against permitting condemned prisoners to
terminate their appeals, and thus bring on their executions.84 First,
by terminating his or her own appeal, a prisoner may be jeopardiz-
ing the lives of other death row inmates because it might trigger a
"national avalanche of legal slaughter." 85 Second, this "death
wish" should be considered "primafacie evidence of mental distur-
bance and, therefore, that others have a duty of care to intervene." 86
Bedau's third argument is that even if a condemned prisoner had a
right to take his or her own life, "it would not follow that he had the
right to compel the state to take it for him in the name of punish-
ment." T8 7 Finally, although Bedau grudgingly concedes a right to
die for those who are incurably ill, he denies a comparable right to
those on death row because he does not consider them as "termi-
nal" in the same sense. 8
These arguments do not, however, rely either on legal authority
or on any consistent philosophy regarding individual autonomy.
Rather, they are a deeply felt instinctive response to a situation po-
tentially intolerable for the abolitionists, namely, that if they con-
done cases of voluntary execution, then their entire argument
against capital punishment fails: one cannot selectively condone
murder.8 9 For an abolitionist, there is apparently no middle
ground; any execution by the state must be resisted.
82 Lenhard ix rel. Bishop v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 815 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of stay of execution).
83 H. BEDAU, supra note 5, at 122.
84 See id. at 121-25.
85 Id. at 122.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 123.




If one looks more closely at these arguments and examines
them in the light of both legal and ethical considerations, their sur-
face logic fails. First, ever since Gary Gilmore ended a ten-year
moratorium on executions in this country, each new execution has
brought dire warnings of an impending national bloodbath. Cer-
tainly with nearly thirteen hundred persons on death row and a net
addition of approximately one hundred each year,90 the nation
would have to execute ten persons a week for three years just to
catch up with the backlog. But the facts show that despite indica-
tions of a growing dissatisfaction with endless appeals, the courts
continue to insist on individualized evaluations of each case. Even
Bedau concedes that the "avalanche" has failed to materialize. 9
Unless and until firm evidence is presented that voluntary termina-
tion of appeal does in fact affect the rights of other prisoners, there
should be no restrictions on these persons that prevent them from
exercising their rights.
92
The second argument, that the "death wish" is prima facie evi-
dence of mental incompetence, has appeared in some judicial opin-
ions, 93 but only rarely, and it too has little factual or legal basis. As
will be discussed below, current writings in biomedical ethics do not
equate all desires to end one's life with mental disturbance.94 For
the abolitionists, however, if suicidal inclination can be labeled as
incompetence, then the would-be "victims" could be foreclosed
from dropping their appeals. Lester Maddox, while governor of
Georgia, favored abolition of the death penalty and found a reason
to commute one prisoner's sentence to life imprisonment after hear-
ing that the man, William Clark, had said he wanted to die. "He
must be nuts," concluded Maddox. "Even animals want to live. I
don't believe any person who has any sense at all would want to
die." 95 But as the Supreme Court has noted, "the empirical rela-
tionship between mental illness and. . . a suicide attempt need not
always signal an inability to perceive reality accurately .. . 96
Even if one granted condemned prisoners a right to take their
own lives, Bedau argues that condemned prisoners cannot compel
the state to do it for them in the name of punishment. 97 Bedau
wrote in obvious anger at the Gilmore case, with the press making
90 See Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE LJ. 908, 936 (1982).
91 H. BEDAU, supra note 5, at 122.
92 See infra notes 126-163 and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
94 See infra notes 144-150 and accompanying text.
95 B. WOLFE, PILEUP ON DEATH Row 29-30 (1973).
96 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 n.16 (1975).
97 See H. BEDAU, supra note 5, at 122.
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Gilmore into a modern antihero, and he properly condemns as "lu-
dicrous" 9 8 Thomas Szasz's claim that Gilmore was trying to force
Utah to live up to its "contract" with him, i.e., by virtue of his crime,
Gilmore had bargained with Utah to provide a death penalty.99 It is
true that no one can "force" a state to execute someone, but if there
is going to be the system of capital punishment, then it would seem
that the condemned prisoner, the state, and the public all have a
right to expect that the system will act in some rational and consis-
tent manner. As will be discussed below, the irregularity and unreli-
ability of the current system may well create an environment so
degrading that all the inmate wants is to have the situation resolved,
even if that resolution means death. 100
Bedau's fourth argument seems most at odds with the general
abolitionist view of granting human dignity to prisoners. If, as the
abolitionists argue, capital punishment is an inhumane deprivation
of rights as well as a degradation of the individual, then why should
not death row inmates be allowed-if they themselves so choose-to
accept their punishment with dignity. It is certainly ironic that in
the Gilmore case, the American Civil Liberties Union passionately
fought to prevent the execution of a convicted murderer who
wished to die, claiming that Gilmore had no right to do so. It then
turned around and argued that a right to die existed for Karen Ann
Quinlan, who was unable to express her wishes one way or the
other.' 0 ' One might infer from Bedau that although society may
not exact retribution from convicted murderers by taking their lives
through execution, they may punish them by locking them away for
life and denying them a right to die, no matter how terrible the con-
ditions of imprisonment. For, as will now be examined, it is the
death row environment that is a crucial issue in the whole debate.
IV. LIFE ON DEATH Row
The simple reason most condemned prisoners want to termi-
nate their appeals is that they find conditions on death row intolera-
98 Id. at 123.
99 Szasz, The Right to Die, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 11, 1976, at 8.
100 One possible response to Bedau's argument, but one that it is doubtful he would
accept, has been put forward by Martin Gardner. Gardner suggests that condemned
prisoners be permitted the option of taking their own lives, perhaps by means of a lethal
overdose. Gardner is not being facetious; he favors such an option as more humane
than current modes of execution and as consistent with the prisoner's human dignity
and freedom of choice. See Gardner, Execution and Indignities-An Eighth Amendment Assess-
ment of Methods of Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 OHIo ST. L.J. 96, 110-11 (1978).




ble.102 Doris Ann Foster, one of eleven women currently awaiting
execution, put it bluntly: "Death is my only route to freedom."' 0 3
She presently is confined to a small cell in the Maryland Correc-
tional Institution for Women for stabbing a seventy-one-year-old
woman to death with a screwdriver during a robbery. She has writ-
ten to both the Maryland Court of Appeals and the United States
Supreme Court asking them to ignore the efforts of her public de-
fender lawyers to reduce her sentence to life, and she dreads the
prospect of a long, drawn out appeal. "If the court says you're
guilty and you're going to die, why spend all this money to fight it?
Let them carry it out. They will be satisfied, and I will have
peace."' 0 4 Continuing in a legal limbo while confined "is ruining
my body and eventually would ruin my mind. . . I have no desire
to continue on in such an inhumane existence." 10 5
Foster's attitude is not uncommon among condemned prison-
ers. Robert Lee Massie pleaded guilty to-first degree murder com-
mitted during a 1965 robbery and received the death sentence.
Four times execution dates were set, and four times lawyers for the
NAACP, acting without Massie's consent, managed to secure stays,
claiming that he was mentally incompetent. For Massie, this on-
again, off-again condition was worse than death, and in a widely-
noted article he asked:
Would [Christ] condemn me to a four-by-ten cell year after year, giv-
ing me dates of execution, and bringing me back from the brink of
death each time the sentence was about to be executed? Would He
subject me to this kind of mental torment? Since we all know He
would not participate in these atrocities, then how are Christians able
to justify the laws which permit such inhumanity to man? If you are
adherents to the Mosaic law, which advocates "an eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth," then my question is: Would Moses subject me to
years of mental torment before putting me to death? I did not confine
my victim for years in prison under the constant threat of death before
killing him, so why is it being done unto me?10 6
Following Furman v. Georgia,10 7 which temporarily held all state
death penalties as unconstitutional, Massie received another re-
102 The abolitionist response to this argument is to do away with the death penalty
entirely, and thus do away with death rows. This Article is premised upon the belief that
this country will not, in the foreseeable future, do away with capital punishment. If that
penalty remains, and prisoners are still warehoused on death rows, we should be aware
of the stress this imposes and examine ways to reduce it. Under such conditions, a form
of suicide is not irrational.
103 An Eyefor an Eye, TIME, Jan. 24, 1983, at 32.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Massie, Death by Degrees, ESQUIRE, Apr. 1971, at 179.
107 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
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prieve and was eventually paroled, only to commit another robbery
and murder, for which he received the death penalty in 1979. Once
again, he asked the court to decide upon his punishment and make
an end to it. He "has no desire to be executed and does not object
to spending the rest of his life incarcerated; he, however, finds exe-
cution preferable to spending a lengthy period on death row."
10 8
Once again, however, issues of incompetency have been raised, and
Massie's case remains unresolved.
The long-time warden of Sing Sing prison, Clarence Duffy, ac-
knowledged that by their nature, conditions on death row had to be
horrible: "The men of death row live in fear and hopelessness, and
their thoughts are never off the glass-walled enclosure that waits for
them six floors below. This is not justice but torture, and no court
in the land will deliberately sentence a defendant to that."' 10 9
Before the Furman decision, one commentator detailed some of the
conditions in various state prisons, and concluded that confinement
on death row produced mental suffering that violated the eighth
amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment. 110 So
atrocious were some of these prisons (not just the death rows) that
various state and lower federal courts ordered immediate remedia-
tion. 111 Although it is unlikely that courts will find confinement
awaiting execution to be per se unconstitutional (especially because
the long wait usually is due to prisoner appeals), there is no doubt
that the very conditions inherent on death row can cause extreme
mental anguish.
In recent years, there have been several studies of these condi-
tions, 112 all documenting the stress faced by prisoners awaiting
death and not knowing when or if it will come.' 13 A few samples
from these studies will give an idea of the environment these men
and women face, week after week, month after month, year after
year. Moreover, because of the special security requirements, death
row prisoners rarely mix with other inmates and are often unable
108 Massie v. Sumner, 624 F.2d 72, 73 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1103
(1981).
109 C. DUFFY, 88 MEN AND 2 WOMEN 254 (1962).
110 See Note, Mental Suffering under Sentence of Death: A Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 57
IOWA L. REV. 814, 815 n.5 (1972).
111 For a brief review of court involvement in reforming prison conditions, see Com-
ment, Federal Intervention in State Prisons: The Modern Prison-Conditions Case, 19 Hous. L.
REV. 931 (1982).
112 See, e.g., S. GETTINGER, SENTENCED TO DIE: THE PEOPLE, THE CRIMES, AND THE CON-
TROVERSY (1979); B. JACKSON & D. CHRISTIAN, DEATH Row (1980); R. JOHNSON, CON-
DEMNED To DIE: LIFE UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH (1981).
113 See Bluestone & McGahee, Reaction to Extreme Stress: Impending Death by Execution, 119
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 393 (1962).
570 [Vol. 75
TERMINATION OF APPEAL
even to socialize with each other. Their only company consists of
prison officials, their lawyers, and occasional visitors.
Some people go crazy on the Row, and there is even less help for that.
Perhaps it is reasonable to go crazy, living under such confined condi-
tions for so many years. In August 1979, 42 men on the Row had been
there more than three years. Further, some people were pretty much
crazy when they got there. Everyone on the Row thought the man who
beat his skull against the steel bunk was seriously disturbed. The Row
was divided about the man who talked and screamed all night; some
felt he was quite mad, others felt he was putting on a bothersome per-
formance. It's a tough audience on the Row, and if one is faking, one
had best be very good at it.
114
Death Row is a prison within a prison, physically and socially isolated
from the prison community and the outside world. Condemned pris-
oners live twenty-three and one-half hours alone in their cells, punc-
tuated by thirty minutes devoted to private exercise in a closely
guarded outdoor cage designated for high security risk inmates. Only
passive recreation is available to the prisoners on death row. The in-
mates try to fill empty time with exercise, reading, reverie, television,
or conversation with their neighbors. Strategies vary. For some men, a
tightly patterned sequence of private activities and accomplishments is
required to reduce anxiety and maintain self-control. 15
As an example of how prisoners in Alabama pass their time, John-
son reports the following exchange:
PRISONER: I have got so bored at times, I used to hook cock-
roaches together, sort of like they was a team of mules, to drag a
matchbox around on the floor to pass time. I mean that may sound
weird to you or somebody else, and it might be. Matter fact I just
flushed a little frog down the shit jack the other day that I had back
there. It came up through the shitjack. I kept him back there a couple
of weeks and I kicked roaches and things to feed him.Just any little old
thing.
INTERVIEWER: Just to keep you busy.
PRISONER: To more or less keep your mind off the damned
chair and the things that you're seeing around you. Anything to oc-
cupy your mind. 16
Given such conditions, which are apparently endemic to all death
rows, it becomes more understandable for a California inmate to
say: "I would rather go downstairs to that gas chamber than have to
spend the rest of my life here. Being free is being alive. If a person
goes down to the gas chamber he's escaped. It is going to cost him
his life, but he's escaped."' "
17
114 B. JAcKSON & D. CHRISTAN, supra note 112, at 175 (Texas death row).
115 R. JOHNSON, supra note 112, at 47 (Alabama death row).
116 Id. at 48.
117 S. GETHNGER, supra note 112, at 96.
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Over twenty years ago, Jacques Barzun, one of the most percep-
tive social critics of our time, wrote a controversial article in favor of
capital punishment. 1 8 One key argument that he put forward sug-
gested that life in prison might well be a fate worse than death. To
abolitionists who held a life sentence better than execution, he
responded:
They read without a qualm, indeed they read with rejoicing, the hide-
ous irony of "Killer Gets Life"; they sigh with relief instead of horror.
They do not see and suffer the cell, the drill, the clothes, the stench,
the food; they do not feel the sexual racking of young and old bodies,
the hateful promiscuity, the insane monotony, the mass degradation,
the impotent hatred. They do not remember . . . that Joan of Arc,
when offered "life," preferred burning at the stake ....
• . . For my part, I would choose death without hesitation. If that
option is abolished, a demand will one day be heard to claim it as a
privilege in the name of human dignity." 9
This does not mean that all, or even a majority, of death row
inmates would elect death over long-term imprisonment. But it
would temper the abolitionists' blithe assumption that life is always
preferable to death if they kept the reality and the quality of that life
in mind. As Barzun concluded: "I shall believe in the abolitionist's
present views only after he has emerged from twelve months in a
convict cell."' 1
20
Death row is by nature nothing more than a warehousing oper-
ation, storing condemned prisoners until the appeals process has
either freed them from the threat of death or run its course and
delivered them to the death room. One need not go so far as Rob-
ert Johnson, who argues that "a death sentence amounts to death
with torture," 121 to recognize the depressing and degrading condi-
tions in these units. Nor should one forget that these people stand
convicted of murder, some of which involved horrid torture, mutila-
tion, and degradation of their victims. Perhaps locking them away
in such an environment is fitting retribution, more terrible in its se-
verity than the finality of death. But that is not the choice of punish-
ment society supposedly has made. So long as imposition of the
death sentence is permitted, prisoners should not be denied the op-
tion of asking the state to implement its justice. Gary Gilmore's law-
yer summed up this attitude when he wrote:
Mr. Gilmore had sufficient experience of prison life to estimate . . .
what it would be like for him to languish in prison. Historical, reli-
118 Barzun, In Favor of Capital Punishment, 31 AM. SCHOLAR 181 (1962).
119 Id. at 188-89.
120 Id. at 189.
121 Los Angeles Times, Aug. 20, 1982, §2, at 11.
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gious, and existential treatises suggest that for some persons at some
times, it is rational not to avoid physical death at allcosts. Indeed the
spark of humanity can maximize its essence by choosing an alternative
that preserves the greatest dignity and some tranquility of mind.
122
The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of suffering
attached to the death sentence aside from the actual mode of execu-
tion, and that case came down in 1890 when the Court approved the
use of the electric chair. 123 Punishments are cruel, held the Court,
"when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment
of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
Constitution. It implies something inhuman and barbarous, some-
thing more than the mere extinguishment of life."' 124 Not until
1958, in a non-death penalty case, did the Court hold that a per-
son's humanity must be respected regardless of guilt or crime. 125
Abolitionists consider capital punishment in itself violative of the
eighth amendment, but even those who favor the death penalty
ought to concede that months or years on death row is certainly
"more than the mere extinguishment of life." If one is going to
argue that even condemned murderers retain some spark of human-
ity, some rights of individual autonomy, then something must be
done to either improve death row conditions, or permit those who
wish to terminate that existence through execution of sentence the
right to do so.
V. SUICIDE AND THE RIGHT TO DIE
For some prisoners, the atmosphere on death row has proven
more than they could bear, and they have bypassed the system by
taking their own lives. In the last ten years, thirteen condemned
persons have committed suicide, and others, like Gary Gilmore,
have tried to do so. The reasons for suicide vary from person to
person. Millard Farmer of the Atlanta Team Defense Project be-
lieves that living conditions on death row are so onerous that they
"could cause the most stable person not to cope."' 26 There are
some who cannot take it anymore; some who are trying to get atten-
tion; and for a third group, suicide is their final act of defiance.
A short time before he overdosed on antidepressant pills that
he had been hoarding, Alexander Bowling, a condemned murderer
122 N. MAILER, supra note 7, at 706 (quoting William Barret's brief to the Supreme
Court for the Utah Attorney General's office).
123 See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
124 Id. at 447.
125 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (unconstitutional to punish person by
denaturalization).
126 Los Angeles Daily Journal, July 19, 1982.
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on Kentucky's death row, wrote to his attorneys: "Being alive means
nothing if there's nothing in your life to do. You have to have some-
thing in your life to look forward to each day." 127 In his study of
Alabama's condemned population, Robert Johnson found this im-
agery pervasive, with many prisoners characterizing their existence
as a living death, and themselves as the living dead.' 28 Even a re-
prieve with commutation to life is not always attractive because it
usually would not include a chance of parole. "If it's either living in
prison or dying in that chair, I'm going to go ahead and be extermi-
nated. There ain't no way I'm going to die in a penitentiary, unless
they execute me." 129 Even if they retain a chance at parole, many
current inmates would be fifty or sixty years old before they get out
of prison. "Don't make no sense to get out then. What you gonna
be able to do to make a livin'? Might want to kill myself then anyway
... . It's better off all the way around to get it over with than it is
to go out there."' 130
Suicide has to be examined not just in the context of the capital
punishment debate, but as part of the larger discussion in biomedi-
cal ethics of the limits of control over one's own life to which one is
entitled, and whether these limits include the right to terminate that
life. In the past decade, this has become a particularly fruitful and
relevant issue, both for law and ethics, although the primary focus to
date has been on whether terminally ill patients may choose to stop
life-sustaining therapy.
131
English common law traditionally opposed suicide, and under
an act of Parliament, suicide was considered a felony; the property
of thefebo de se was forfeited to the Crown, and "'he was ignomini-
ously buried in the public highway and a stake driven through his
body.' "1132 English law thus reflectedJudeo-Christian opposition to
the taking of one's own life. With the exception of martyrs who
chose to die kiddush ha-Shem (for the sanctification of God's Name),
the rabbinic teachers agreed that suicide was forbidden.' 33 The
church fathers also condemned suicide. Augustine held that the
commandment "Thou shalt not kill" refers "to the killing of a man;
127 Fitzgerald, The Loss of a Client, THE ADVOCATE, Oct. 1982, at 1.
128 R. JOHNSON, supra note 112, at 110 (quoting unidentified prisoner).
129 Id. (quoting an Alabama inmate).
130 Id. at 111-12. See also B. JACKSON & D. CHRISTIAN, supra note 112, at 264-65.
131 See Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 67 (1979). For a particularly useful article exploring the
issue, see Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity
versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1973).
132 Comment, The Right to Die, 7 Hous. L. REV. 654, 655 (1970) (quoting State v.
Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 850, 251 N.W. 717, 718 (1933)).
133 TALMUD, Baba Kamma 91b; A. COHEN, EVERYMAN'S TALMUD 75 (1949).
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not another man; therefore, not even thyself." For Thomas Aqui-
nas, life was "God's gift to man . . . [therefore] whoever takes his
own life sins against God."'
13 4
At the same time, there is an equally ancient tradition uphold-
ing the right to end one's own life. The Stoics, for example, did not
consider suicide prejudicial to one's character, nor did the Romans
condemn the practice. Many people of the upper classes in Rome,
according to historians, resorted to suicide when they felt their lives
were no longer worthwhile.' 3 5 Following the rise of the Catholic
Church and canon law, this view went into eclipse, but in 1777,
David Hume, the noted Scottish philosopher, published an essay de-
fending suicide. He argued that if God is the creator of the world,
then His will must be expressed in all events, and therefore suicide
cannot be a departure from that will. Hume also rejected the con-
tention that suicide harmed society in all instances; in some cases,
suicide might benefit society and be the best way to fulfill one's duty
to oneself and to others.'
3 6
Contemporary thought on suicide is extremely diverse, ranging
from opposition on religious, philosophical, or humanitarian
grounds to the belief that individual autonomy includes the right to
end one's life. American common law never adopted the harsher
English view, and in no state today is there a law prohibiting suicide;
in three states, however, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Washington,
it is against the law to attempt suicide, but not to succeed in the
attempt. 137 The most prevalent form that the issue has taken in
modern law concerns the refusal of patients to accept or continue
treatment that might save or at least prolong their lives.
Up until the latter part of this century, the question arose only
rarely because medicine lacked the technical ability to prolong life
in the face of massive infection, advanced disease, or the failure of
bodily organs. Although courts generally acknowledged judge Car-
dozo's language that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body,"' 38 courts did so only in terminal cases and, in fact, "devel-
oped a wide variety of formulations that inhibit[ed] realization of
134 ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 102-03 (T. Beauchamp & S. Perlin eds.
1978).
135 See Comment, supra note 132, at 655.
136 D. Hume, On Suicide, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING, supra note 134, at
105-10.
137 See Comment, supra note 132, at 656.
138 Schoendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
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ultimate control by the patient."'' 3 9 The issue gained national atten-
tion in the Karen Ann Quinlan case, 140 when it became obvious that
science had the means to keep a person's essential organs function-
ing, even if that person were, by normal criteria, dead. Did people
have the right to refuse such heroic measures, if continued living
meant nothing but prolonged physical pain and mental distress,
both for the patients and for those they loved?
Much of the case law on this subject has centered on religious
freedom, with members of certain groups refusing blood transfu-
sions, operations, or other types of therapy because of their reli-
gious beliefs.' 4 1 There is a growing body of legal and religious
opinion that heroic efforts to sustain life when the person's body can
no longer do so by itself may be terminated by the patient, or by the
family or attending physician if the patient is no longer able to make
a decision. 142 Pope Pius XII, in 1957, declared that a physician may
not refuse or stop ordinary treatment because that omission might
cause death, but extraordinary measures, such as employing a respi-
rator when the patient's own circulatory system had failed, could be
terminated because death in such a case would be the result of in-
jury or illness.
143
The broader issue involves the right to die not only when a per-
son is terminally ill and wants to forego weeks or months of suffer-
ing with no hope of recovery, but when for other reasons, the
quality of life is such that a person no longer wants to live. Despon-
dency, hopelessness, guilt, or shame may all make someone's life so
unbearable that death appears as a release from an intolerable situa-
tion. The question in these instances is whether an individual has
such a right encompassed within the notion of personal autonomy,
and if such a right exists, whether society may impose obligations
that limit personal autonomy and mitigate the right to die.
Students of biomedical ethics have suggested certain criteria
that should be considered in determining whether or not a particu-
lar suicide is "moral."1 44 The three principles that Beauchamp and
139 Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE LJ. 1632, 1634 (1974).
140 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
141 See generally Annot., supra note 131.
142 Id. See generally Brown & Truitt, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, 3 OHIO N.U.L. REv.
615 (1976); Cantor, supra note 131.
143 See Comment, supra note 113, at 660.
144 I am not concerned here with technical nomenclature distinguishing between "ac-
tive suicide," in which a person takes positive steps such as shooting oneself, and "pas-
sive suicide," also known as "antidysthanasia," in which one either allows death to come
without resistance or refuses to accept life-prolonging therapy. "Euthanasia," or mercy
killings of terminally ill patients, is for the most part legally considered murder,
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Childress put forward are:
1. Autonomy. If one truly believes in the autonomy of each in-
dividual, it would "be a showing of disrespect to deny autonomous
persons the right to commit suicide when, in their considered judg-
ment, they ought to do so."145 Legally, this ties in to the developing
theory of a "right to privacy," which, absent overriding concerns of
the state, holds that individuals ought to be free in making those
judgments most personal to themselves. ChiefJustice Burger, while
on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
pointed out that this right does not give society the power to decide
what is best for the individual:
Mr. Justice Brandeis, whose views have inspired much of the "right to
be let alone" philosophy, said: "The makers of our Constitution...
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emo-
tions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized man." Nothing in this utterance sug-
gests that Justice Brandeis thought an individual possessed these
rights only as to sensible beliefs, valid thoughts, reasonable emotions, or
well-founded sensations. I suggest he intended to include a great many
foolish, unreasonable and even absurd ideas which do not conform,
such as refusing medical treatment even at great risk. 146
2. Human worth, also termed "sanctity of human life." Is
human life so intrinsically valuable that its destruction is an act of
murder and therefore wrong? Opponents of suicide may allow
someone to die instead of applying heroic medical efforts, but deny
that one may kill a person, even himself, because this is an irrevoca-
ble act of destruction. This view, in its strongest form, would op-
pose all manner of imposed death, including abortion, execution by
the state, murder, or even by one's own hand. A weaker version of
the principle would hold that although human life always has intrin-
sic value, this by itself is not the overriding consideration, but only
one factor to take into account.
1 47
3. Utility. With respect to this principle, one looks at the im-
pact of suicide upon the interests of all concerned, not only of the
individual, but of the family and society as well. If a person has no
family, no dependents, and no debts or obligations to others, a utili-
although not capital murder. For death row inmates, termination of appeal is consid-
ered antidysthanasia on technical grounds. See Note, Death Row Right to Die, supra note 4,
at 604 n.199.
145 T. BEAUCHAMP &J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 87 (1979).
146 In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Bur-
ger, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
147 T. BEAUCHAMP &J. CHILDRESS, supra note 145, at 87-88.
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tarian calculus would provide no negative items to balance the per-
son's desire to end pain, suffering, or any other condition that
favors the suicide. If, on the other hand, a person has a family that
loves and is dependent upon him or her, or if the person has talents
the absence of which would deprive society, then this would go into
the balance against suicide. 148 In its starkest form, the "utilitarian
demand [is] that the greatest possible amount of value or at least the
smallest amount of disvalue be brought about by the person's
actions."1
49
Beauchamp and Childress further argue that each of these three
principles is prima facie binding, that is, they assert primary duties
that cannot be ignored, either by the person contemplating suicide
or by those who would intervene:
[T]o the extent the principle of autonomy or one of the other princi-
ples just mentioned is relevant, and does not come into conflict with
other principles, it is our duty to observe the principle. Thus, if a sui-
cide were genuinely autonomous and there were no powerful utilita-
rian reasons or reasons of human worth and dignity standing in the
way, then we ought to allow the person to commit suicide, because we
would otherwise be violating the person's autonomy. A similar analy-
sis could be given for instances falling under each of the principles.
This indicates that whether suicide is right or wrong is never a simple
or absolute matter. The morality of suicide cannot be determined in
abstraction from the facts of a person's own situation.' 50
Not all defenders of a right to suicide agree with this outline; some
consider the issue of personal autonomy to be the only considera-
tion.15' But the outline does provide a useful framework in which to
examine decisions made on death row.
1. Autonomy. For the prisoner, convicted and condemned by
society and restrained in a tiny cell with practically no freedom, the
148 Several cases have followed the rule that where minor children are dependent
upon the individual, his or her obligation to them precludes a right to refuse treatment,
even on religious grounds. See, e.g., Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125
(N.D. Ill. 1972); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Cf. Ra-
leigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 NJ. 421, 201 A.2d 537
(transfusion ordered for pregnant woman to preserve life of unborn child), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 985 (1964). Where the patient is not responsible for others, however, the
courts generally have ruled that individual wishes should be respected. See, e.g., In re
Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). There have, however, been cases
in which courts have deferred to medical opinion despite the expressed wishes of the
patient. See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971). In addi-
tion, the courts must be assured that the patient is competent to make the decision; if
not, the state, as parens patriae, will act to save the person's life.
149 T. BEAUCHAMP &J. CHILDRESS, supra note 145, at 89.
150 Id.
151 See, e.g., Szasz, The Ethics of Suicide, 31 ANTIOCH REv. 7 (1971).
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option of terminating appeals and being executed may represent the
only opportunity to exercise any personal choice in order to affect
his or her fate. For the abolitionists, this may be the most difficult
aspect of the problem, for granting the condemned person the right
to bring on death affronts their belief in the sanctity of human life.
But what must be remembered at all times is that the life involved is
that of the prisoner; it is his or her life at stake, his or her personal
autonomy, and not that of the abolitionist. The only argument that
can be made is that a murderer, by taking the life of another person
and denying the victim's autonomy, has invited retribution through
the loss of his or her autonomy. Yet the abolitionists deny that such
"an eye for an eye" rationale is consistent with the values of a pro-
gressive society or with the goals of punishment.
2. Human worth. For the condemned, the quality of life on
death row has depreciated to nothing or little better than nothing.
If we grant to the terminally ill the right to die, it is because we
recognize the distinction between merely being alive and living as
free and autonomous individuals. We recognize that pain and suf-
fering may reach a point where death brings release. How often
have we heard it said that the death of a cancer victim, for example,
was a "blessing"?
Yet for the abolitionists, human life is so sacred that none
should be extinguished needlessly, and this principle outweighs any
other, even that of personal autonomy.15 2 One certainly can sympa-
thize with the ethical problems confronting lawyers, for example,
who are faced with the express wish of their clients that the appeals
be dropped so they can meet their deaths, and with the attorneys'
own commitment to humanizing the law and preserving life.' 53 In
some instances, there may be legitimate reasons to question
whether the prisoner is mentally competent to exercise autonomy,
and for counsel to properly bring the facts to the attention of the
court in order to secure a psychiatric examination to determine
152 Some abolitionists base their belief in this area on religious justification, and note
thatJudaism and Christianity both forbid suicide. Yet under the first amendment, pris-
oners also must be allowed freedom for their religious beliefs. In the landmark case of In
re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 372, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1965), religious principles
were held to outweigh the desires of third parties to save a person's life. If abolitionists
insist upon treating condemned prisoners as individuals who still retain certain funda-
mental rights-as they ought to do-then one of these rights must be religious freedom,
with the individual free to place a value on his or her own life within his or her religious
framework, not in the value system of a third party.
153 "Counsel have determined that their obligation to their client, as well as to the
Court and society, would not be satisfactorily fulfilled if they were to take no action at all
on the basis of their client's instructions." Statement of Counsel, In rejoseph M. Giar-
ratano, No. 118475, (Cir. Ct. Norfolk, Va. 1981).
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competency. One should, however, beware equating a suicide wish
with incompetence. Glanville Williams has charged that
"[p]sychiatrists are too ready to assume that an attempt to commit
suicide is the act of a mentally sick person,"1 54 and abolitionists
often may commit the same error. 155 If the value of his or her life is
of little value to the prisoner, does a third party, no matter how
dedicated to the sacredness of life, have a right to intervene?
Suicide intervention is commonly acknowledged as a legitimate
intrusion by third parties, but only up to a limit. The would-be sui-
cide must be made aware of options and must recognize the finality
of the act; he or she also must recognize that other people value his
or her life, and would be saddened by its ending; psychiatric help
should be provided if necessary. But beyond that, third-party inter-
vention displaces the individual's autonomy and essentially places
him or her under the control of another, contrary to the individual's
wishes. No doubt counsel of condemned prisoners often develop
close emotional ties to their clients, yet the courts have time and
again refused to allow uninvited third parties, even parents, to dis-
place the autonomy of prisoners. 156 Those who believe strongly in
the sacredness of life may not agree, but here too the ultimate bal-
ancing of values must remain in the hands of the individual
involved.
3. Utility. Unlike the other two areas, the desires of the indi-
vidual may be balanced against the interests of others, including so-
ciety, family, and persons affected by the decision. Yet according to
some studies of death row, it is concern for these other people that
often motivates prisoners to seek death. Frank Coppola, for exam-
ple, sought execution to end the shame and embarrassment he be-
lieved his family suffered because of his trial and subsequent
incarceration.' 57 Some prisoners also may believe that they should
accept their punishment in order to pay their debt to society and
obtain absolution and forgiveness of sins.
158
154 G. Williams, Euthanasia, 41 MEDICO-LEGALJ. 27 (1973).
155 See, e.g., H. BEDAU, supra note 5, at 122.
156 See Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 291-92 (1953) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring); see also supra notes 44-47, accompanying text, and cases cited therein.
157 Los Angeles Times, Aug. 20, 1982, § 2, at 11.
158 Richard Hager, an Oklahoma inmate seeking execution, told a reporter in 1977:
I believe in Jesus Christ. In the last two, two and a half months, I've found some-
thing that's beyond words. It's brought a real peace to me. And it's brought a lot of
peace to the other four men on Death Row. We've had something really fantastic
happen back there. We're all pretty well behind it now. I tell you, Jesus Christ
walked Death Row.
For Hager and others, the walk to the electric chair is "the road to Glory Row." S.
GETrINGER, supra note 112, at 70.
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Yet there is no doubt that the state has an interest here that
overrides that of the individual. Above all, when imposing a capital
sentence, there is a need to be sure that no mistakes have been
made in either the guilt or sentencing stages so that public confi-
dence may be maintained in the criminal justice system. This re-
quires, on one level, a standardization of the process so that similar
criteria are applied to all persons accused of capital murder, and on
the other level, the individualization of the process to ensure that
each defendant's mitigating as well as aggravating circumstances are
taken into account. As Chief Justice Burger has noted: "The need
for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of re-
spect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more important
than in noncapital cases."' 59
Insofar as appeals are concerned, there need be no contradic-
tion between standardization and individualization in order to meet
the interests of the prisoner and of the state. Capital punishment
statutes can spell out clearly the standard requirements for impos-
ing the death penalty, and automatic reviews by appellate courts can
ensure that these standards have been met in terms of fairness
across all cases as well as in each particular instance. Collateral at-
tack still can be pursued as a further safeguard on the process, and
thus serve the common interests of prisoner and society. Whenever
it appears that a prisoner may be incompetent, the court should or-
der psychiatric evaluation; if the prisoner is adjudged incompetent,
then a guardian ad litem may be appointed to protect his or her inter-
ests in securing proper treatment, continuing appeals, and other
matters. For those who wish to appeal or are unable to determine
the issue for themselves, it is in the best interests of both the state
and the individual to ensure that all legal challenges to a death sen-
tence have been exhausted before the sentence is carried out.
But once review has taken place, thus meeting the Supreme
Court's minimal procedural safeguards, 60 then the state may well
claim that it has met its obligations. If a prisoner wishes, further
appeals then may be taken; if not, respect for individual autonomy
requires that the choice of the condemned be respected. This also
should include limiting third-party intervention absent some show-
ing of incompetence on the part of the defendant, and a wish to end
159 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion).
160 The Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1978) (plurality opin-
ion), upheld a Texas statutory scheme providing for expedited appeal in capital murder
cases, indicating that mandatory review is not necessary for due process provided that
an appeal is immediately available.
19841
MELVIN I. UROFSKY
the appeals process should not be taken as evidence of
incompetence.
There is, of course, the ultimate argument of the abolitionists
that the death penalty might be imposed by mistake, and an inno-
cent person executed for a crime he or she did not commit.' 61 What
if such a person, believing there is no hope for rectifying the error
and confronted by the hopelessness of prison life, elects to termi-
nate the appeal and accept death? Jack Potts, convicted of capital
murder, had determined not to pursue his appeals and was less than
thirteen hours from death when his girlfriend convinced him to
change his mind. Two years later, a federal judge ruled that the
sentencing phase of the trial was invalid. 162 Although the ruling up-
held the guilt determination so that one cannot argue Potts' inno-
cence, it may turn out that imposition of death in this case was
wrong. Abolitionists would argue that even one mistake such as this
undermines the integrity of the entire judicial system and the only
means to rectify it is to abolish the death sentence completely; fail-
ing that, every prisoner should, voluntarily or involuntarily, take the
appeals to the ultimate limit to defeat the death sentence.
The abolitionist position ignores the fact that no system is com-
pletely foolproof; errors always will creep in no matter how we try to
avoid them. What must be balanced is not the possibility of error as
against all other values, but as one of several values that must be
weighed. Sanctity of life is one value, but so is the need of society to
impose punishment on those who break the social contract and de-
prive others of their lives. Avoidance of error is important, but not
as great as individual autonomy. After the State takes all possible
precautions to avoid error and at the same time protect the interests
of society, the final decision on whether to pursue or terminate ap-
peals should be left to one person-that person whose life is at
stake. Society has stripped that individual of nearly all the rights
that free persons enjoy; to take this decision away would, as Judge
Sneed pointed out, "incarcerate the spirit-the one thing that re-
mains free and which the state need not and should not
imprison."163
161 See C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE
(2d ed. 1981).
162 Atlanta Constitution, Jan. 14, 1983, at D1. See Potts v. Austin, 429 F. Supp. 326
(N.D. Ga. 1980).
163 Lenhard ex rel. Bishop v. Wolff, 603 F.2d 91, 94 (1979) (Sneed, J., concurring), stay
of execution denied, 444 U.S. 807 (1979) (mem.).
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